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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the civil war in May 2009, Sri Lanka’s government has continued to
consolidate the unitary state and centralize power by combining political reform,
patronage, and economic development. However, two forces countering such unity
and centralization became evident during the course of the year. First, tensions and
contradictions associated with the simultaneous pursuit of political centralization
alongside rapid economic development and liberalization. Second, there has been
an intensification of external pressures to bring about a political settlement with the
Tamils and to address government accountability, including its alleged involvement
in war crimes.
KEYWORDS: constitutional reform, political centralization, economic liberaliza-
tion, accountability and war crimes, international pressure
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION
IN 2012, the Rajapaksa government continued to consolidate its position by
holding early Provincial Council elections, repressing political opposition
in the south and northeast, and introducing far reaching reforms that, if
implemented, would further concentrate power in the executive. These
developments have met with some domestic friction and resistance, particularly
from the judiciary and Tamil political parties, but, in the main, little has
countered these centralizing tendencies.
Early Provincial Council elections were called as a tactical buildup to early
parliamentary and presidential elections, as the government wanted to go to
the polls while its popularity remained high. Elections for three of the eight
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Provincial Councils (North Central, South West, and Eastern) took place on
September 8. According to independent observers, they were neither free nor
fair. Yet, the results in the south, where the United Peoples Freedom Alliance
(UPFA) ruling coalition won 60% of the vote, clearly reﬂected continued
support for the government in the majority Sinhalese electorate. In the
ethnically mixed Eastern Province (40% Muslim, 35% Tamil, and 25%
Sinhalese), the results were less clear cut. The government failed to win
a majority of seats there, though ultimately it managed to patch together
a majority coalition. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which had
boycotted the 2008 provincial election, got the vast majority of Tamil votes,
consolidating its position as the voice of the Tamil people. Given that the
TNA would likely repeat this result in the Northern Provincial Council
elections due in 2013, this will increase the UPFA’s reluctance to hold the
elections in the north. The Provincial Council system was introduced under
the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1987 in order to address Tamil
grievances by devolving power to the north and east. Paradoxically, Provincial
Councils are now functioning in all provinces except the one with a Tamil
majority.
The elections also highlight the continued decline of the main opposition
party, the right-leaning United National Party (UNP). It has been undermined
by leadership conﬂicts, party crossovers, and a lack of grassroots mobilization in
recent years. While the TNA may be a thorn in the side of the UPFA in the
north, where Tamils are the majority population, in the Sinhalese-majority
south there is no credible opposition to the current regime.
The government continues to deal harshly with other potential sources
of opposition, including critical voices in civil society, the media, and the
judiciary. Since the end of the civil war, roughly one person has been
abducted or ‘‘disappeared’’ every ﬁve days.1
THE DIVINEGUMA BILL AND HIGH COURT IMPEACHMENT
In addition to conﬁrming its mandate at the ballot box and repressing
domestic opposition, the government has sought to introduce reforms that
undermine both the checks and balances on the executive as well as the
1. ‘‘A Disappearance Every Five Days in Post War Sri Lanka,’’ Groundviews, August 30, 2012,
<http://groundviews.org/2012/08/30/a-disappearance-every-ﬁve-days-in-post-war-sri-lanka/>, accessed
December 1, 2012.
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long term prospects of a political settlement to the Tamil question. The
Divineguma Bill (Uplifting Lives) presented to Parliament in August, aimed
to establish a superministry in the form of a Divineguma Department and to
consolidate economic resources that were previously controlled by statutory
government authorities and elected Provincial Councils.
The proposed law was challenged in the Supreme Court on behalf of the
sole non-functioning Provincial Council—the Northern Province. Supreme
Court Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake ruled that the Divineguma Bill
must be approved by all the Provincial Councils before it can be passed by
Parliament. This led to retaliatory action by the government in the form of
impeachment proceedings against Bandaranayake; a parliamentary select
committee found her guilty of professional misconduct in December, but
in January 2013 an appeals court found the moves to impeach the chief justice
unlawful.2 In its efforts to centralize power, the government appears to be
determined to eliminate the possibility of future obstruction by the courts or
Provincial Councils. The impeachment threatens to further undermine
judicial independence and has led to protests from diverse sources, including
the four chief priests of the Buddhist Sangha (Assembly) and the Bar Asso-
ciation. The bill can be seen as consistent with, and complementary to, the
18th Amendment passed in 2011.3 Together, these constitute an attempt to
concentrate unprecedented political and ﬁnancial powers in the presidency.
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE NORTH EAST
Since the end of 2011, political negotiations between the TNA and the
government have remained suspended. Negotiations were to occur through
a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), but this has not yet been consti-
tuted because the TNA refused to give nominations unless certain precondi-
tions were met by the government.4 The UPFA government calculates that
2. In spite of this ruling, the president subsequently dismissed Bandaranayake, and a new chief
was appointed in January.
3. The 18th Amendment’s main changes were the removal of presidential term limits, previously
set at a maximum of two six-year terms; the 17th Amendment was repealed, which provided checks
on the powers of the president; and the election commission lost its power to prevent the use of state
resources during elections.
4. The PSC will have 31 members of which ﬁve will be from the TNA. Given its weak repre-
sentation, the TNA has made its participation in the PSC conditional on a guarantee from the gov-
ernment that the agenda for discussions would not go below a certain existing devolution threshold.
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with its two-thirds parliamentary majority and its electoral vote base in the
south, it can either safely ignore minority demands or coopt their represen-
tatives into the government coalition by giving them Cabinet posts in return
for political support.
The TNA’s room for maneuver is extremely limited, as it is squeezed by
government demands and threats, on the one hand, and Tamil diaspora and
diplomatic pressures, on the other. Although the TNA has shown a willingness
to compromise on some issues in order to start talks,5 it has adopted a hardline
position on others, including its unambiguous rejection of the Lessons Learned
and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC, see below) and its choice to focus on
the question of accountability rather than the material interests and concerns of
Tamils living in the north and east. This arguably plays into Rajapaksa’s
attempt to portray the TNA as a rump of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), beholden to the diaspora rather than concerned with the
socioeconomic and political aspirations of Tamils within the country.6
Apart from external pressures, there are challenges from within Sri Lanka
to the TNA from Tamil nationalist civil society and those associated with the
Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF)7 led by Gajen Ponambalam, a former
TNA parliamentarian. They argue that the TNA is being pulled into ‘‘nor-
mal,’’ Sri Lankan patronage-based politics by a combination of government
threats and incentives, along with international diplomatic pressure from the
U.S. and India. There is also increasingly vocal activism in the Tamil-
majority Indian state of Tamil Nadu, as parties there have ratcheted up
concerns over Sri Lankan Tamils, often for political gains. For example,
recently re-elected Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha has urged Delhi
to put pressure on Colombo and has interceded to block the training of Sri
Lankan military personnel in Tamil Nadu.
External efforts to break the TNA-Sri Lankan government deadlock have
had little impact despite U.S. and Indian shuttle diplomacy. Following the
Norwegian peace facilitation experience from 2002–08, in which the Sinhalese
5. For example, the leader of the TNA met with three members of the government delegation on
January 27, 2012, and made several concessions. It was agreed that the TNA would nominate names
to the PSC simultaneously with the recommencement of the bilateral talks and that the PSC would
be convened only after substantial agreement was reached at the bilateral talks.
6. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solution,’’
Asia Report, no. 239 (November 2012).
7. Launched on February 28, 2010, the TNPF is a breakaway faction of the TNA. Its main
constituent is the All Ceylon Tamil Congress.
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south feared that negotiations might lead to the division of the country, there
has been a heightened sensitivity to any form of external mediation. The
government’s military victory over the LTTE in 2009 further eroded the
legitimacy, and the perceived necessity, of mediation. The government has
refused to clarify its position on what powers should be devolved to the
provinces in spite of assurances to India, U.N., and U.S. ofﬁcials that it
would fully implement, or go beyond, the 13th Amendment.8
In the north and east, the government’s focus is on economic development
rather than political devolution. The postwar economic rebound has contin-
ued, supported by major infrastructure projects (including roads, railways,
ports, airports, the northern power grid, and a Jaffna-Kilinochchi water and
sanitation system); increased trade between the Tamil north and Sinhalese
south; and the growth of agriculture and ﬁshing.
However, the TNA has been unable to win any signiﬁcant concessions for
political normalization in the north. Although troop levels have been reduced
in the Jaffna Peninsula, this has not been the case on the Vanni mainland.
The civil administration runs in parallel to, and is frequently overruled by,
a separate military architecture.9 There is, as yet, limited evidence of system-
atic and large-scale Sinhala colonization of Tamil regions. Creeping Sinhali-
zation, on the other hand, is occurring in the form of appointments of
Sinhala government ofﬁcials, the renaming of roads and villages, the growth
of military monuments and museums, and the erection of Sinhala signboards
and Buddha statues. Militarization (also an agent of Sinhalization because the
army is almost entirely from the majority community) continues with the
construction of large and permanent military cantonments in the north,
making up a comprehensive security complex of major base camps linked
to a system of detachments and satellite camps.10 Military surveillance of the
population occurs through a network of Tamil informers, some of whom
have been recruited from the pool of recently released LTTE detainees.
However, the government’s hegemony in the north does not go uncontested.
8. It has been assumed negotiations would revolve around the precise details of the degree of
devolution to the provinces––whether in the form of a 13th Amendment ‘‘plus’’ involving more
substantive regional autonomy than that contained in the original legislation, or in the form of a 13th
Amendment ‘‘minus,’’ which would involve a more limited arrangement in which some powers were
devolved but the center retained responsibility for land and policing.
9. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military,’’ Asia
Report, no. 220 (March 16, 2012), p. 15.
10. Ibid.
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There have been protests over land issues, for example. And on November 28
(named ‘‘Heroes’ Day’’ by the LTTE), there was a clash between Jaffna
University Tamil students holding a ceremony to remember the war dead
and the police who tried to break up the gathering and arrested six students.
Over time, though, the political voice of the Tamils is likely to be under-
mined by demographic trends. Sri Lanka’s ﬁrst national census in 30 years has
shown a 20% drop in the population of the Jaffna Peninsula, the long-time
base of Tamil rebels during the island’s ethnic conﬂict from 1983–2009. One
likely consequence of the new census ﬁgures will be a reduction in Tamil
representation in the national Parliament. Nine seats are currently allocated
for Jaffna, but this could drop to six.
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND CRONY CAPITALISM
The post war economic rebound continued in 2012 based upon the four
pillars of reconstruction in the north and east, infrastructure spending, busi-
ness investment, and rising property investment. Tourist arrivals during the
ﬁrst eight months of the year grew by 16% from the previous year, and the
government has targeted one million arrivals for 2012. In April, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its seventh review of Sri Lanka’s
performance under a program supported by a stand-by agreement and
approved the release of a further $426 million, out of a larger $2.6 billion
loan approved in 2009. In August, China pledged a further $1.1 billion in
concessional loans toward the construction of the second phase of the South-
ern Province’s Hambantota port and railway facilities.
However, a poor monsoon season and weakening external demand have
dampened growth. Real GDP growth is predicted to slow to 6.7% in 2012
from an estimated 8% in 2011.11 There are also questions about the sustain-
ability and political impacts of the postwar rebound. A visiting IMF delega-
tion raised concerns about balance of payments problems given an increasing
trade deﬁcit, falling foreign reserves, and an unsustainable rupee peg. These
concerns have been accentuated by increased global oil prices and U.S.
sanctions on Iran, the source for 90% of Sri Lanka’s oil. The annual average
consumer inﬂation rate was an estimated 7.2% in 2012. Moreover, in an
attempt to create an ‘‘investment friendly’’ environment, the Colombo
11. ‘‘Country Report Sri Lanka,’’ Economist Intelligence Unit, London (October 2012).
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government has embarked upon what has been characterized as a ‘‘second
wave of neoliberalism’’ after the ‘‘ﬁrst wave’’ of 1977.12
The collapse of the Colombo Stock Exchange, from one of the best
performing markets in the world two years ago to one of the worst perform-
ing this year, is indicative of the volatility associated with the government’s
ﬁnancialization strategy. It may also be an early sign that, with the growth of
crony capitalism, the ﬁnancial interests of the regime are now beginning to
trump the larger interests of national and global capital.13 The credibility of
the government with international investors is low; scandals in the stock
market and in major economic projects, such as those involving power
generation, are not being investigated.
In the 2013 budget, the biggest allocation went to the Ministry of Defence
and Urban Development, amounting to Sri Lankan Rs 290 billion ($2.25
billion), an increase of Rs 60 billion ($460million) from 2012. While defense
spending has remained at around 3% of GDP for the past few years, it makes
up 20% of total expenditures––dwarﬁng those on education and health.
Containing current spending will be difﬁcult because of the political
imperative to increase expenditure on the civil service and military. With
mounting economic pressure, particularly related to IMF austerity measures,
the regime is in danger of losing its social base. This base showed signs of
instability and resistance during the year, such as in strikes involving lawyers,
doctors, university teachers, and railway workers. Each had their own par-
ticular causes and dynamics, but all are perhaps manifestations of growing
dissatisfaction in the south with the Rajapaksa regime. At the present
moment, however, there is no political party or leadership with the potential
to unite these diverse sources of discontent. At the same time, nationalist
insecurities stoked by the war crimes issue (see below) and the Tamil dias-
pora, play a role in keeping the regime’s support base in line and preventing
southern discontent from boiling over.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The government may have calculated that the pressure to address the issue of
war crimes and accountability for civilian casualties at the end of the conﬂict
12. Ahilan Kadirgamar, ‘‘Stockmarket Crisis and Oligarchic Interests,’’ Island, August 25, 2012,
p. 28.
13. Ibid.
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would recede through a combination of the passage of time and the activities
of its own LLRC, formed in May 2010. However, external pressure from the
international community has continued to grow. Although the LLRC was
criticized for evading the core question of accountability, its recommenda-
tions presented in December 2011 did provide a basis for moving forward on
a number of key issues including devolving power, demilitarizing the Tamil
northeast, and dealing with the political roots of the conﬂict through devo-
lution. However, the LLRC report generated no political and institutional
momentum to implement the recommendations, leading to continued frus-
tration among international actors.
In March 2012, a U.S.-sponsored resolution on ‘‘Promoting Reconciliation
and Accountability in Sri Lanka’’ was passed at the 19th session of the U.N.
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), calling for the implementation of the
LLRC recommendations. India played a pivotal role by backing the resolu-
tion while helping to dilute the ﬁnal text, confounding Sri Lanka’s expecta-
tion of support from its neighbor. The Indian role can be interpreted as
a clear sign of Delhi’s frustration with the Sri Lankan government’s failure
to make any progress toward a political settlement. It can also be interpreted
as a signal to disabuse the Rajapaksas of the value of their ‘‘China card’’ and
the potential for them to exploit strategic competition between India and
China. In spite of China’s growing presence in the country, India remains the
regional hegemon with greater geostrategic interests and economic invest-
ments in Sri Lanka. Delhi’s position has consistently been to advocate for
implementation of the 13th Amendment, and growing pressure from Tamil
Nadu has lent new urgency to showing progress on this issue.
In response to the UNHRC resolution, the government produced
a National Action Plan to implement the recommendations of the LLRC.
But critics of the action plan argue that it largely sidesteps the central issue
of independent investigations into alleged war crimes and the need to
restore the independence of the police, judiciary, and other public bodies
from the executive. On November 1, the U.N. Periodic Review took place,
again placing the human rights record of the Sri Lankan government under
the spotlight. International attention is likely to be maintained in 2013,
with the holding of the 22nd session of the UNHRC in March and the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGOM) in Colom-
bo in November (which the Canadian government is threatening to
boycott).
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CONCLUSIONS
The year has seen the Rajapaksa administration further consolidate its power
base by pursuing a strategy of rapid economic growth and centralizing
reforms. Provincial Council elections in the south conﬁrm that the strategy
is working for now, and the government retains the support of its core
Sinhalese constituency. The resolution of the Tamil question appears to be
more distant than ever, and the main drivers of change are not likely to come
from the Tamil polity. Instead, such change will likely be the result of
increasing international pressure on accountability and growing discontent
in the Sinhalese south about repression, corruption, and the uneven effects of
liberalization across the country.
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